Historian Robert Tombs on the 1,000-Year Rivalry Between Britain And France

TRIGGERnometry

Historian Robert Toombs explores the deep-seated historical rivalry between Britain and France, tracing its evolution from the Hundred Years

Key takeaways

• The French identity was significantly forged through centuries of military conflict with the English.
• European integration was primarily a French strategic initiative designed to contain Germany and reassert French leadership.

Main topics

• Anglo-French Rivalry
• The Napoleonic Wars

Notable quotes

The French came to realise they were French through fighting the English.

Conclusion

A profound look at how historical grievances and strategic maneuvers c

Transcript preview

Speaker 3 (0:01) As a great 19th century French historian said, the French came to realise they were French through fighting the English. Both for quite a long time now, indeed the French, I suppose since the Battle of Waterloo, have been rather obsessed with the idea that they are nations in decline. The idea of European integration was to make sure that Germany was no longer a danger to France. And secondly, to make sure that France was essentially leading Europe. So that's how France becomes a great power again. Brexit was the way of reasserting our position as a great nation. It's their great national project and has been for a long time now. And therefore for the British to walk away from it was a kind of slap in the face. But it also meant that the French absolutely want Brexit to fail. In many ways we respond to the same challenges in opposite ways. Speaker 1 (0:52) Are you too popular? Is life too easy? Then head over to our merch store and change your life forever by telling the world you watch Trigonometry. You'll be able to buy hoodies, t-shirts, caps, stickers, posters, and of course, the world famous Trigonometry mug. Go Speaker 2 (1:06) to shop.triggerpod.co.uk. That's shop.triggerpod.co.uk and become part of the show. Speaker 1 (1:17) Historian Robert Toombs, such a pleasure to have you on the show. It's great to be here. It's wonderful to have you. There are so many different things that we could talk about. We love discussing history with eminent historians like you. The one thing that we wanted to focus is something you cover in one of your books, which is the England versus France, or now Britain versus France rivalry. It's the most Speaker 3 (1:39) fun book I've Speaker 1 (1:40) ever done, I think, by a long way. And you have personal experience. I think you're married to a French lady. Speaker 3 (1:47) Yes, we were co-authors. Speaker 1 (1:47) Yes, indeed. So the rivalry is injected throughout. Yes, it's in the book. That's right. Tell us about England and France and the rivalry between these two. I mean, I was about to say countries, but actually it goes, it precedes the existence of countries at all, doesn't it? It does, really. Speaker 3 (2:06) In fact, both England originally. and France and to some extent Ireland Scotland Wales developed identities their own identities through the conflict there are the Scots with their Alliance with France us with our long conflict with France and the French as a great 19th century French historian said the French came to realize they were French through fighting the English in this is in the first hundred years war and you might say well why is it still kind of there and I think the the answer's you know fairly plain both france and britain have had huge influences on world history in the last 300 years they've been major players on the world stage and often as rivals indeed quite often as enemies sometimes as allies quite often as enemies and they're they've got a bit obsessed with each other um and and like to see each other as opposites though in my view they're in some ways rather similar And another thing is that both, for quite a long time now, indeed the French, I suppose, since the Battle of Waterloo, have been rather obsessed with the idea that they are nations in decline. We all know that now. You go to France, they'll say, no, nothing works here anymore, which is what we say all the time. So there's a sense of countries in decline and even in crisis. And you might say, well, why does that play into the... anglo-french thing and i think it's because both are really rather keen that the others should be doing worse than them Speaker 2 (3:39) so Speaker 3 (3:40) you know you look at le monde or uh look at the times and you see you know reports on things happening in france fires in france strikes in france and if you look at the french press it's often about you know unemployment in britain uh for another prime minister goes in britain aren't we well off compared with with them i think it's it's quite important in both countries to see themselves as doing at least not as badly as the other one. Although, you know, when we go there, of course, the other reaction is for people who are rather keen on the idea that their own country is in decline, which many people are, to go to France, in our case, or for them to come here and say, wow, you know, we went to wherever, and it was really great. You know, the trains ran on time. The hospitals were great. You know, why are we so awful compared with them? So this kind of obsession works. in all sorts of ways. And I suppose the thing that added to it was obviously Brexit. Because the EU, European integration, is something the French have been working hard at for at least a century. In the 1920s, they first proposed it. And it's really always been a French project. And it's something which the French establishment agrees is something which is fundamentally in France's interest. Indeed... It's their great national project and has been for a long time now. And therefore, for the British to walk away from it was a kind of slap in the face. But it also meant that the French absolutely want Brexit to fail. It has to fail. If it looked like succeeding or even not being a disaster, it would reflect badly on the whole EU project. So, of course, the French want it to fail or at least be seen and be seen to fail. And so this has re-injected a new element into the old story of the rivalry. Speaker 1 (5:33) And what is it about the mindset of the French elites, as you describe it, that makes them think that the European Union is in the interests of France and a good idea more generally? Speaker 3 (5:43) Well, I think essentially it was the conflict with Germany. One shouldn't assume, of course, well, we don't, that any country has an exclusive... relationship with another. We and the French, of course, have one. But we also have ours with the Americans. We aspire to a special relationship with them. The French have a similar relationship with Germany. Because the Germans, as we know, after all, did invade France three times in 150 years. And therefore, the European integration project was essentially to make sure that Germany was never a threat again. And although, you know, so rather as we do with the Americans, the French are very keen to show how wonderful their relations with Germany are, because these fray occasionally, as we know. But lots of gestures about friendship and special friendship and so on, because it can't be accepted that... This isn't true. And so the EU, or from the very beginning, the idea of European integration was to make sure that Germany was no longer a danger to France. And secondly, to make sure that France was essentially leading Europe. So that's how France becomes a great power again. De Gaulle said, I thought, very, very shrewdly, we have to behave like a great power because we no longer are one. And leading Europe has been the French thing since the 1950s. And nothing that can be allowed to get in the way of that. Speaker 1 (7:12) I see. So if you're no longer a great power, but you sit atop of the European conglomerate, you then are effectively projecting power for 500 million people that live in Europe. So you hope. So you hope, and you are therefore powerful again. Yes. That's really interesting. And of course, coming back to the history of it, my understanding, and do correct me if this is wrong, is one of the reasons there has been this great rivalry between Britain and France many times in history is that Britain's, England and then later Britain, has perceived this national interest to be to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic power on the continent, to which France has repeatedly aspired. And Brexit, you might argue, is yet the latest iteration of that. Speaker 3 (7:55) Absolutely. Indeed, again, this fits into the story, as you say, because for the French to make Europe is the reassertion of their greatness as a nation. For Britain, at least for those who supported Brexit, Brexit was the way of reasserting our position as a great nation, no longer simply part of a bloc. In many ways, we respond to the same challenges in opposite ways. So this goes back to the 1950s, very obviously, when European integration after the Second World War got off to another start. So, and what happened, of course, we all know about this. Well, I'm not sure how many people under the age of 30 do, but we sort of know about the Suez Crisis, in which both France and Britain made an attempt together. to assert their power as imperial powers. You know, the last hurrah, if you like, of France and Britain as independent global powers. And it didn't work because the Americans, and to some extent the Russians, said no. So what happened? The French say, we must therefore... we'll never trust the Americans again. We must look to Europe. That is our only, in a sense, our only real policy. And the British, on the other hand, say we must never quarrel again with the Americans. And so America and the relationship with America will be our policy. So although the British did join the, of course, the common market, as it then was, it was always rather reluctantly and conditionally, you know, OK, this is just a trade bloc. we don't want any talk of federalism we're not going to go along with the session of sovereignty etc etc whereas for the french that was always really the object it was to make europe a great power in a sense, with its capital in Paris, to stand up to the Americans, whereas for the British, it was always how to be nice to the Americans. And as we saw with the time of Brexit, the Americans basically say, we want you to be in this European thing because we'll be sure that you'll be on our side. Or as the French would say, you're our Trojan horse or you're our poodle and you will do what we say and you'll make sure the Europeans don't do anything against our interests. Whereas for us, the American relationship was seen as a kind of the major player. And the European membership of Europe was really a secondary matter. That's something the Americans wanted and something that would probably be quite good for the economy, though it never really was. But it was not the centre of our foreign policy as it was for the French establishment. You know, I'm generalising, obviously. but insofar as we can generalize about you know a consensus view among british politicians officials diplomats we can say the same about the french and they they um well you might say the foreign office tends to take a rather french view of things at least it has in recent years but traditionally there's been a clear difference between british and french views of their own of their own national interest Speaker 2 (11:06) And one of the things that you actually mention about in the book, Robert, which I enjoyed very, very much and I recommend for everyone to get, is when you were talking about Napoleon, Napoleon's vision for Europe was actually kind of similar to the European Union vision, wasn't it, in many ways? Speaker 3 (11:21) It was in a way. I mean, Napoleon was a great moderniser, as he saw it. Indeed, you could say what he really was. He did say at one point, there's not enough sameness in the European nations. So a single system of law, single system of administration, okay, an empire, but it was largely a bureaucratic and military empire. It was meant to be something that would sweep away the old distinctions, the old conflicts. And, you know, some things he did, abolishing feudalism, abolishing the power of churches, putting a stop to anti-Semitism. Those were things that, of course, many people in Europe welcomed. The British, again, saw it differently. We didn't ever want a Europe which would be dominated by Napoleon. And indeed, we weren't terribly keen on his idea of what a modern Europe should look like. So, you know, for that reason, the conflict went on for whatever, however many years it was, 15 years, 20 years. Speaker 3 (12:31) it became a global conflict and it was one that really set the pattern of power in the world for Well for more than a century well for a century anyway and Speaker 2 (12:41) Before we really focus about Napoleon because we're obviously going to want to talk about him It seems as well that his ideas Not only were generated through his own vision, but they also came from the French Revolution as well, didn't they? So let's talk about the French Revolution. Why was it so important and What effects did it have not only in France, but in Europe, but also the UK as well. Well, yeah Great Britain at the time Speaker 3 (13:05) Well, I take a, I'm not sure this is a sort of slightly heretical view, but I take a rather reductionist view. I mean, people talking about the French Revolution, they go on about the ideas of the Enlightenment, the ideas about democracy, how the French learnt from the Americans, life, you know, all that stuff. And therefore they decided they wanted to have a revolution which would modernise the country and bring it. Well, it seems to me that the French Revolution was essentially a reaction to defeat. The French... had lost the Seven Years War. They won the American War of Independence. That was their great victory, but they got nothing out of it except vast debts. They then found that they were pretty well neutered on the world stage because of their lack of money. Very familiar story. And the revolution came because they almost became a failed great power. okay you know yes the peasants the workers all that the stormy the bastille that all that happened of course but it was essentially um well actually burke said this um if i can remember it correctly he said the french revolution was not to make france happy was to make her powerful and i think the revolution was really about recreating france as a as a power and um you know you could say well People like Robespierre or Danton and so on, they were very keen on the people's rights, weren't they? Speaker 2 (14:35) Yes, Speaker 3 (14:36) they were. They were also very keen on spreading French influence across Europe. And in a way, Napoleon didn't really change that. What he did was to, as he said, he cleaned it up. He cleaned the mud off the French Revolution and gave it permanent institutions. But the French dominance of Europe was something that they all agreed on. Speaker 2 (14:56) And it was a concern for Britain at the time, wasn't it, what was happening? And Britain was in a quandary because they were, on the one hand, this was this ancient enemy. On the other hand, it was kind of better the devil you know with the royal family, wasn't it? Speaker 3 (15:13) Well, when the Bastille fell, the British ambassador was keen to calm things down. This is in the book, by the way, but it's a nice story. He decided that a cricket tour would be rather a good idea to calm the French down. So he recruited a cricket team. The power and intellect of British democracy through the ages. Well, Marie Antoinette was supposed to have kept his bat as a souvenir, but cricket didn't catch on in France for quite a long time. But the British, first of all, thought, wow, this is great. France is turning into a new version of Britain. And if Louis XVI is taken down a peg or two, that suits us very well. France will be weaker, and hence we will be stronger. What they didn't, of course, realise at first was that it wouldn't make France weaker, it would make France stronger. And Britain went to war with the French Revolution, not really because we didn't like the ideas of the revolution, because a lot of people did. The Whigs did, Charles James Fox did, all those people thought it was great. It was because the French were going to invade Holland. And that, you know, brings you back to the almost the oldest and most permanent part of British European policy, which is we don't want a potential enemy in the low countries. Because if you want to invade Britain, if you want to invade England, at least, if you want to sail up the Thames estuary, that's the place to do it from. It doesn't matter you can have a navy in Toulon or in Brest. That's a safe distance away. You can't have an enemy navy in Ostend or Rotterdam. And that's why we went to war with the French. Speaker 2 (16:56) And also as well, they got involved in Ireland, didn't they? They did, yes. Well, Speaker 3 (17:01) of course our relations with Ireland, as the late Queen said, have not in every way been what we would wish. And still not. But what the English were particularly interested in, Ireland force, in order to stop it being used as a jumping off point for an invasion. that almost that's the only thing that really counted deep down. But of course it was. It was always potentially the place that the enemy would invade you from if Ireland was independent. Is it now really independent? Well, it's kind of disarmed and neutral. That's the next best thing, I suppose. But if Ireland was, you know, in the past had been a potential ally of Spain, then a potential ally of France, in the Second World War a potential ally of Germany, these were things that Britain could not accept. And in the Second World War, it was made pretty clear to the Irish government that they had to be very careful. And they were. De Valera, the president, did, as you probably know, present his condolences to the German legation when poor Herr Hitler met a sticky end. But apart from that, they didn't much help the Germans. the IRA would have done if they could have done, but they didn't get round to it. Speaker 2 (18:32) The people who watch this show have generally done more thinking about how governments operate the most. But there's a difference between understanding the problem and having actually built insulation against it. That's the world Mikhail Thorup operates in. He's been living as an expat for over 25 years, visiting more than 110 countries and calling nine of them home. He founded expat money nearly a decade ago to help others do the same. When he helped someone build an international plan B, the knowledge he brings is entirely firsthand. Every recommendation comes from something he has already done himself. 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It's kind of a pattern, or at least you can see it as a pattern. What is a revolution? You have a breakdown, the fall of the Bastille, the storming of the Winter Palace in Russia, whatever, the collapse of the old regime. And then you have a period of chaos. Everybody says we want our piece of the action. So the workers join in, the peasants join in, the army joins in, whatever. And then sooner or later, people say, this is awful, this is worse than it was before. We need somebody to restore order. In the French case, it was Napoleon. In the Russian case, it was, well, Lenin and then Stalin. And, you know, many people say, well, OK, this isn't what we really wanted or expected. But above all, we want to get back to living our lives, earning our living. we're willing to accept, in fact, a stronger and more