Will the U.S. Strike the Houthis For Saudi Arabia? | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS

The Team House

The episode examines the escalating geopolitical instability caused by Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabian infrastructure and shipping lanes in the Bab

Key takeaways

• The Houthis have increased their capability to disrupt shipping in the Bab al-Mandab by seizing key islands around the strait.
• US interceptor stocks, specifically Patriot PAC-3 missiles, are reported to be at critically low levels due to global demand.

Main topics

• Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia
• US-Saudi security alliance

Notable quotes

The Houthis are the most capable of Iran's proxies.

Conclusion

The episode underscores a period of extreme global volatility where sh

Transcript preview

Speaker 2 (0:00) Hey everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here with Jonathan Hackett, Mark Polymeropoulos, Mick Mulroy, and Andy Milburn will be joining us shortly. A lot cooking, a lot of things blowing up. It seems like, what's that saying about like, you know, things that happen, like nothing happens for 10 years and then something happens. You know, I don't know, I'm fucking up the phrase, but you guys can look it up. But a lot of things, and within a week, 10 years of things happen. Something to that effect. Don't hold me to it. Yesterday, Twitter was a light of Trump was at Camp David. And it's been kind of like a pattern. He goes to Camp David to make big decisions on attacking different countries or not. He got back early, so Twitter was buzzing. They thought a B-1B that flew out of the UK was on its way to Yemen or Iran, maybe. Who knows? It was a training exercise. There was so much just people like... freaking out on Twitter. It's an amazing place and it's also kind of a scary place because things can really go get out of hand there. The big thing is the Houthis have been attacking Saudi Arabia consistently probably over the last week. The big, I guess, debate is whether the U.S. is going to help. Saudi Arabia defend itself, you know, jump in the fray with it, essentially. Let's start with that. Let's start with that because there's so much other stuff, too. We have the European people freaking out in Europe, people meaning like the national security establishment in Europe about Intel supposedly saying that Russia will try and at least probe or do something with a NATO country to test out the Article 5. There's also rumors in Russia about a mobilization. I think that might be getting mixed into this as well. I mean, we obviously see what's going on in Ukraine. They're barely making any kind of headway there. So if they're going to mobilize, I think anyway, they're going to mobilize for Ukraine specifically. Speaker 2 (1:57) That coupled with a couple weeks ago John Ratcliffe rolled up to Moscow and gave I don't know what they did They had a three-hour meeting and he left and there was a ton of speculation about that as well I mean, so it's just a myriad of shit happening Your Ukraine shot over like over a thousand missiles over the like the last few days into Russia have hit in and around Moscow so big refineries and stuff like that, so Also, while the Duma is being elected, the fake parliament that Russia has essentially is having their elections. So there's a ton of stuff happening. Let's start with the Houthis. And will we attack them, you know, in response and defense of Saudi Arabia? I'm going to go with Mick Mulroy first. New grandpa. Congratulations. Maybe Speaker 5 (2:41) you should go with Andy because he's like in the mix. Speaker 2 (2:43) I Speaker 5 (2:44) guess I'm a new grandpa. Wow. Yes, there's a ton of stuff to talk about. When it comes to Iran and its offshoot, the Houthis versus Saudi, we have a ceasefire agreement with the Houthis, the U.S., at least from media reports that was affirmed last week in Oman. The reporting is that the U.S. talked to the Houthis and requested that they not close the Bab al-Mandab, which they are now in better position to do so than they were. a couple weeks ago because they've taken over some of the key islands around the strait itself and positioned themselves to do more damage. So the question for the U.S. is do we join militarily the Saudis and potentially rupture that agreement where they do more than just strike the petrol line from Abqaiq to Speaker 5 (3:38) which is the Coastal Speaker 3 (3:39) Facility, I guess, doesn't matter. Speaker 5 (3:41) And whether they do more than just attack the ships, the Saudi ships that are trying to get through the Speaker 3 (3:47) BAM. Speaker 5 (3:48) They go after every ship. So they do that. So you've got 21 % of the world's energy supply in the Strait of Hormuz, which is effectively closed. And I don't know the ones, I don't understand the transponder. They turn them off because they're eventually going to turn them back on. So I think the tracking systems would still see that. The ship that was in one side is now somewhere else, right? So they could be able to keep up with the ships getting through. So the tracking systems are at about four to five ships right now, when it should be around out of 30. And then the petrol line, which is going to take weeks to be repaired, and then could get struck again, is 7%, so they're up to 28%. And then if you add the shipments to the BAM, we're talking serious problems. And I would agree with you, D, on the Twitter was... flying yesterday not just on the prospect of us attacking either iran or the houthis but what's happening to the world energy market right now even if it's only partially true what's being said on the all over social media, we're about to hit some major shortages of especially diesel around the world. And it's going to have a major spike on prices, not just for the energy to put in our vehicles, but also everything we purchase. So this is about to go, I think, substantially more pressing right at the time. Of course, politically, we're going into the last five weeks before the election. I don't know if this is yet another negotiation tactic to say, oh, we're going to escalate this substantially and see if Iran blinks or if it's real. Because I don't think Iran's going to blink. Because I don't know how many times you can threaten to escalate and not do it before they're just kind of like, well, we'll see. So I'll stop there. I know we're talking just about the Houthis right now, but there is so much more to it. Speaker 3 (5:34) Who wants to go first, Speaker 2 (5:35) Mudwessel? Speaker 3 (5:36) If I could just add on there with the Houthis. So it's interesting because the U.S. has been talking to the Houthis, right? So that's on one side. Iran yesterday in Farsi media did a visit to Mocha and Mayun. Mayun is a small island that's in the Bab al-Mandab, like actually in the middle of that strait. Four IRGC commanders visited. They went on two separate flights. They separated their flights, staggered on purpose for obvious reasons, and visited Mocha and then went all the way down to Mayun. And what that looks like to me is the Huthi are realizing their growing power in the region. Just like how Iran discovered the Straits of Hormuz being more important than they thought it was, the Houthis are currently probably discovering the leverage that they now exert on the Bab al-Mandab. So they're talking directly to the United States and they're hosting visits from the IRGC. So they're in a pretty strong position right now to call some shots, probably, vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, vis-a-vis Bab al-Mandab. Also to try to... perhaps negotiate with the U.S. directly to make it safer for themselves, not just against the Saudis, but remember, Al-Qaeda is also in Yemen. There are also other Salafi jihadist groups in eastern Yemen. So there are other issues and concerns the Houthis might have that they might be trying to purchase through negotiations with the U.S. directly, and also with the IRGC. So they're playing a little bit of a balancing game right now, too. And I wouldn't be surprised if it went more broad, more deep than it is currently. as they discover more of that power that they have over this tiny little space. They control over 250 miles of coastline, which is around 400 kilometers. That's the entire western coast of Yemen, the Tahama coastline. Almost a third of it is within range of the anti-ship missiles that they have. Speaker 3 (7:16) So they're able to really put those vessels at risk if they want to. And the U.S. knows that, the IRGC knows that, and the Houthis know that. So that would be an interesting thing to watch over the next few weeks. How do the Houthis leverage this moment they have? Will they use it wisely or will they squander it? Speaker 4 (7:33) You know, and I've said this on this show before, the Houthis are the most capable of Iran's proxies. And talk about as a threat to the U.S. interests, again, I mean, I know this is a controversial topic, but the last time that Hezbollah really inflicted U.S. casualties, could be wrong, was back in the 80s, right? You know, I'm not defending Hezbollah, I'm just saying the Houthis are the ones. who are really capable. They're capable. We talked last week. Andy was on a run, too. Speaker 1 (8:05) They're like, Speaker 4 (8:05) what? Excuse Speaker 1 (8:07) me? Speaker 4 (8:07) How Speaker 1 (8:08) dare you? How dare you? Speaker 4 (8:12) You said what? Sorry. No, no, no. You said the magic word, and we didn't like it. Mark. Andy, Speaker 2 (8:22) we lost you there. You got cut off. Something happened. There was some kind of interference. Speaker 4 (8:27) Yeah. Okay. Can you hear me now? Yeah, Speaker 2 (8:29) we got you. Okay. Speaker 4 (8:31) I wasn't singing the praises of the Houthis. I was just saying they're the most capable of the Iranian proxies, right? And so now you've got this situation, and we discussed it briefly last week, but it's got worse since last week, arguably, right? So the Yambu, well, first of all, you know, the squeeze on hummus that Iran's putting. I know there's been a little more movement in tankers, but the real problem hasn't been solved and isn't going to be solved militarily. We talked about this for obvious reasons. I mean, you can crack open Straits of Hormuz by sheer military force and pounding everything that interferes with it, but tankers are still at risk and that still drives up insurance costs and it still makes... shipping companies reluctant to take the risk, right? So for Saudi Arabia, exports via the Red Sea, which have to transit, well, they don't have to actually, but generally transit, the ban increased eightfold, right? In the last month or so. And now the Houthis have taken the coastline, as we pointed out, right all along the BAM. And almost simultaneously, D, which means at the same time, Iraqi militia. Thank you. Severed the Yambu pipeline. And in the map that D is going to show, either now or afterwards, you can very clearly see where the Yambu pipeline runs across northern Saudi Arabia from the from the. refineries in the east across to the red sea in the west bypassing the ban right so that's been severed so now that's why oil spiked i know it's back down to 90 bucks or whatever but it spiked up to to 100 and then the saudis doubled down in a couple ways all right i told you they're sophisticated they reached out directly to the united states they reminded the U.S. of a non-aggression agreement back in, I think it was 1922. No, not 20, 2022, right? Just a few years ago, saying, hey, we're not going to attack you. We're not going to attack you with ships. So please don't attack us, basically. And it seemed to have worked, if the media is to be believed. Trump told Saudi Arabia that he would not step in and strike the Houthis. Meanwhile, the Houthis are... stepping it up, right? And they launched cruise missiles, drones, and ballistic missiles at Riyadh and several other targets reportedly throughout Saudi Arabia yesterday. And they're going off the very specific target, Aramco fuel tanks are one, and I'm just reporting what's in the media, right? So you can see there's a theme to this, and it's quite sophisticated. They seem to be blocking interceptions using some kind of jammer. DU asked very astutely in the chat earlier, what is wrong? Why can't Saudi Arabia protect its own skies? And there's a number of reasons. I can come back and talk to that, but I don't want to hog the limelight. I will pause there. So Speaker 1 (11:30) I think one thing that, well, there's a couple of things. Two things I don't want to repeat everybody's points because they're really good. But one is. The Houthis are an FTO, a foreign terrorist organization. Part of their slogan is death to America. Let's remember that. Let's also note that the Trump administration has direct contacts with them. And one interesting thing about the Trump administration is they're kind of violating longstanding U.S. policy and not talking directly to terrorist groups. This is a terrorist group. It's just kind of interesting there. But I think the biggest question for me and this or the biggest issue for me, because I always try to put myself if I had been sitting at the U.S. embassy in Riyadh or at Riyadh Station. liaison with the Saudis or mix old role in DOD, which was very heavily kind of focused on security relationships, is the Saudis are looking at us saying, what the fuck? We are not coming to their defense. We can talk for 55 years on how Saudi Arabia is a very kind of interesting ally. But the bottom line is they're an ally and it's a critical ally in the Gulf. And us not doing this, I think, has disastrous consequences for the future of the United States in the region. All of our Gulf partners are going to look at us. They're going to make other deals down the line. If the U.S. is to have alliances, we have to keep up our promises to them. And so the notion of us, President Trump, turning them down, negotiating with the terrorist group, I think, is all because of, frankly, domestic U.S. considerations. Speaker 1 (12:50) is quite something else. And I think that kind of the last point is price of gas in Michigan today is $4.93. That is a huge political issue in the United States right now, which will affect congressional and Senate races in Michigan. And so I don't know. I just, I think back to my time in the U.S. government, I would not want to be at country team meetings in Riyadh right now because the Saudis are pissed and they probably should be. And I don't care. Sure, the Saudi Air Force, we've given them billions. They should be able to fly. Fighters, they're not and they can't. Andy, you can address this. Bottom line is we are not there for an ally at their time of need. And I got a problem with that. Speaker 5 (13:25) And I think we're going to hear what Mark just said in spades this week at UNGA, right? There's supposed to be some substantial meetings between the White House or President Trump, I should say, and a lot of our Gulf allies who have this very question as top of mind. You know, they housed our military for how many years with the idea that it was going to be good for their security, obviously good for our posture there to project power. And now they're questioning whether we're going to come back. Because we've left a lot of these places that's been struck. And to Mark's point, they're questioning even our willingness to participate in their defense, right? So they didn't, Saudi didn't launch the attacks this time on the Houthis. They're defending themselves, right? So they're asking for a defensive posture by the United States to assist them. And it doesn't look like we're willing to do it. That, I agree with Mark, is going to spread to the other Gulf countries going, okay, so if they're not a reliable partner, who is? Speaker 1 (14:25) Right. That's yeah. And president G Speaker 5 (14:27) we're going to talk about that. He's coming. He's coming this week too. That's I mean. Speaker 5 (14:32) Yeah. Speaker 1 (14:33) I mean, look at this as an opportunity. You know, I know you loved your government service. And I'm being serious when I say this. This would not be a real fun time to be in the Middle East shop of the Pentagon. This would be very tough. It would be very tough. Just as I said, our country team in Riyadh having to explain your Saudi interlocutors and why we're not doing something. This, I mean, you know, it's just, you know, look, national security is a team sport. And talk about CIA. We recruit unilateral sources. We also have liaison relationships. And so the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence community relies heavily on these, and we're not stepping up right now. Speaker 1 (15:07) Yeah, you know, the, again, Speaker 4 (15:10) I saw your astute question about why Saudi Arabia needs U.S. help. And it's really to go after the launchers. Saudi Arabia, and I'm just looking at open source material right now, has an interceptor problem, right? And I'll talk about that in a moment. But the, and, you know, the... The way to solve that is two ways. To solve that problem is a defensive way. And Saudi Arabia does need help with its layering its air defense. It's a massive country. It's the size of Western Europe, right? And there's all kinds of sensitive sites here in Saudi Arabia, right? But I'm going to talk about that in a moment. But that takes time to set up, right? So the big reason Riyadh wants the U.S. to... to go on the offense against the Houthis is destroying launchers. And that's the only way to cut demand instantly on interceptors since supply specifically for the the PAC-3s, the Patriots is, I mean, it's everyone knows the US is in short supply, right? I mean, that is open source knowledge. Lockheed Martin's getting specific direction about where to put them as they roll off the, you know, off the manufactured line. And the U.S. just cannot afford to give PAK-3s away right now. It also helps explain Trump's hesitation because it appears as though, and I'm not defending any decisions, but it appears as though the squeeze on Hormuz might just be working and all aviation assets away from there. Again, I'm not saying this is a good argument. I'm just