What’s Driving Dario? (Robert Wright, Derek Davison, and Daniel Bessner)

Robert Wright's Nonzero

In this episode, Robert Wright, Derek Davison, and Daniel Bessner discuss the escalating tensions in the Middle East and the existential risks

Key takeaways

• The Houthis (Ansar Allah) have gained significant territory, including control over the Bab al-Mandately Strait, threatening Saudi oil transit.
• Dario Amadei, CEO of Anthropic, has advocated for slowing AI development to focus on the 'alignment' problem.
• There is a growing concern that AI will automate white-collar work, potentially leading to structural unemployment similar to previous industrial shifts.
• The hosts critique the influence of 'effective altruism' proponents in shaping geopolitical stances regarding China and AI regulation.
• Oil prices have seen upward pressure, recently crossing above $100 a barrel due to regional instability.

Main topics

• Middle East geopolitics
• AI existential risk
• Effective Altruism

Notable quotes

I learned to code and all I got was this lousy unemployment check.

Conclusion

The episode highlights the intersection of technological advancement a

Transcript preview

Speaker 1 (0:19) You're listening to Robert Wright's Non-Zero Podcast. Speaker 3 (0:30) Oh, look, it's Derek and Danny, which can mean only one thing. It's time for another high-synergy collaborative podcast involving the host of the Non-Zero Podcast. Me, Robert Wright, also publisher of the Non-Zero Newsletter and the co-host of the American Prestige podcast. To put a finer point on it, that would be Danny Besner, historian, author of the recently published book, Imperialist Realism, proprietor, along with collaborator Mark Sussman of the recently established Substack Imperialist Realism, which is gaining momentum even. as we speak. And then Derek Davison, proprietor of the August and excellent Substack Foreign Exchanges. Also, conveniently for us, something of an expert on the Middle East. And for that reason, we're going to turn to him early and just clarify a few things about the, I guess it's safe to say, turmoil in the Middle East. But you guys. It's funny. This wasn't my idea. You guys want to talk about AI. Okay. Okay. I'm willing. Speaker 2 (1:41) Well, Speaker 3 (1:41) it's been in the Speaker 2 (1:42) news. It Speaker 3 (1:43) has been in the news. And look, as long as you bring it up, it's true that I'm author of the recently published book on AI, The God Test, excerpts of which can be found at thegodtesthacktbyskynet Speaker 2 (1:52) .com. I Speaker 3 (1:52) hadn't even thought of that. Oh, you cut me off in mid-URL. Thanks. Sorry. Thanks. That's what I get for my years of dedication to promoting you. The godtest.net, folks, has real excerpts, the entire introduction and so on. Okay, so on this Middle East thing, before we turn to... AI. I'm curious about what both of you think about the prospects for this thing getting, I mean, out of control isn't the right word because things aren't exactly under control. But there was this big kind of expansion of the war recently, the so-called Houthis, the kind of de facto government of Yemen in the sense that they control most of the population and most of the resource rich. Speaker 3 (2:46) You know, they already were trying to deny passage to Saudi tankers that wanted to use the Red Sea since the Strait of Hormuz has become somewhat constricted. And, you know, Saudi Arabia's position between the two. And so they had been, you know, through a pipeline, sending oil to the Red Sea to try to get it out there. The Houthis had, even before recent developments started, you know, firing missiles to complicate that mission. But now they have swept down, gained considerable territory, and in particular territory that gives them control of the narrowest part. of the exit from the Red Sea and makes it even easier. Meanwhile, an Iran allied, you know, force in Iraq, apparently, attacked the pipeline that brings the oil across Saudi Arabia. And so oil prices are now back. Last time I checked, above 100 a barrel, which hadn't been the case for quite some time. And that's... Probably not welcomed by the Trump administration. But so, Derek, what should we think about this? Speaker 2 (4:06) It's hard to know how this is going to affect the Iran war yet. I think it's premature to say, A, that, you know, that Ansar Allah is, or the Houthis. That's the real Speaker 3 (4:20) name for the Houthis. That's what they call Speaker 2 (4:22) themselves. That they are going to. operate here as they're often portrayed in Western media as just purely an Iranian proxy or cutout, which they're not. And they don't show any indication of acting that way. So I'm still waiting to see how these two things are going to sort of interact with each other. It certainly is a big deal from the standpoint of Saudi oil sales. The pipeline, you know, it's the most immediate concern. And I don't know when that's going to be reopened. The Saudis have said very soon. Your guess is as good as mine on that. And then the question becomes, how do they get it out once they get it? You know, if they repair the pipeline, how do they get that oil out? And I mean, the Houthis control the entire Red Sea coast of. Yemen at this point. They control the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. They control Mayun Island, which sits, you know, kind of overlooks the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. They don't really need to do anything sophisticated to prevent Saudi ships from getting through. Like, they could put some guns on Mayun Island and probably that would be enough. How Speaker 3 (5:40) narrow is it between the island and the land to the west of that is what? Like, 20, 30 miles or something? I mean, Anyway, Speaker 2 (5:50) it's pretty... Yeah, it's about 25-ish kilometers, I think, wide. Whoa, so that's like Speaker 3 (5:57) less than 20 miles. So yeah, that's like, yeah. Speaker 2 (6:01) So yeah, I mean, so they have that lockdown, and I don't see any reversal of those gains happening anytime soon. The Yemeni army collapsed, or the units that were supposed to be protecting Mocha and the point south along the Red Sea coast. And the reporting that we've seen or that I've seen at least since that took place suggests there weren't that many actual – like it was sort of a paper army on some level. A lot of commanders inventing soldiers so that they could get paid salaries. Inventing Speaker 3 (6:40) mercenaries. I mean there were mercenaries whose heart wasn't in it to begin with. from other countries, and then some of them were fake. Yeah, there Speaker 2 (6:48) have Speaker 3 (6:48) been a lot of Speaker 2 (6:49) Sudanese brought in. Nothing is less formidable Speaker 3 (6:51) than a fake mercenary, a mercenary who doesn't actually exist anyway. Speaker 2 (6:56) Yeah, they tend to not do so well in combat. So I think there's a lot of questions about how capable the Yemeni military, such as it is, or the coalition. supporting the internationally recognized government is at this point in terms of its capabilities on the Speaker 3 (7:16) ground. Speaker 2 (7:16) Which Speaker 3 (7:16) is Speaker 2 (7:16) kind Speaker 3 (7:16) of a Saudi proxy or ally. Speaker 2 (7:20) I mean, yeah, the ironic thing here is the Houthis or the Ansar Allah are portrayed as nothing more than Iranian proxies, which is belied by, you know, a lot of the things that they've done and their actions. The internationally recognized Yemeni government is more or less headquartered in Riyadh. It is a proxy of the Saudi government. There's facilities, the palace in Aden. There's a presidential council that sometimes meets in Aden. But most of the decision making gets done in Riyadh. So, yes, they are definitely a Saudi proxy. And I just don't know. I mean, the Saudis, you know, have been appealing. for help, they appealed to the U.S. and Donald Trump said, thank you, no, we're fine. In fact, supposedly, Speaker 3 (8:11) we met with Yemenis. Supposedly, right. With Speaker 2 (8:14) Ansar Allah. To say, we won't attack you as long as you just interdict Saudi shipping Speaker 1 (8:23) and don't go Speaker 2 (8:24) any further than that. There seems to be a deal in place there. The Saudis do have their... Mecca military alliance that they can call on now with Pakistan and Turkey. But the Pakistanis seem to be looking for any reason not to get involved. And really, I mean, as long as the bulk of the fighting is in Yemen, they have a justification for saying like this doesn't activate a mutual defense treaty because it's not really they're not really attacking Saudi Arabia. I mean, you know, that's a funny area, but it's the same Speaker 3 (9:00) type Speaker 2 (9:02) of consideration you get with NATO and other alliances like that. Speaker 3 (9:06) People have suggested that the Houthis might cross the Saudi border, which, you know, I would think, I don't know if you think that's plausible, that could. I would think, create a much larger mess. I mean, there's already... I don't want to discount that possibility, Speaker 2 (9:21) but why would they? Like, what's there to gain? That's my feeling. When Speaker 3 (9:24) people say that, I just, I don't think they're, you know, people just don't attribute enough rationality to, you know, Arab and Persian states generally, maybe, but especially what are technically non-state actors. Whereas if you look at what they do... They are arguably sometimes more carefully calculating than, say, Donald Trump, for example. Speaker 2 (9:47) And what they want in this case is an end to the Saudi blockade on northern Yemen. The Saudis have been blockading northern Yemen by air, sea, land, whatever, for years now. They were in negotiations to, they've been in negotiations to lift the blockade. And that's where things were at, sort of in. not making a lot of progress, but they were supposedly, you know, still talking about lifting the blockade when, you know, several weeks ago, the Saudis fired on an Iranian aircraft that was going to land at Sinai airport, which really kicked off all of this, everything that's happened since. So Speaker 3 (10:25) final question before we turn to my favorite subject, artificial intelligence is, Speaker 3 (10:33) Well, it's related to what you said, I think, about, you know, the extent to which the Houthis are a proxy of Iran is overstated. It's overstated with all of Iran's proxies, but apparently it's most overstated with the Houthis. They have the most autonomy. I think so, Speaker 2 (10:52) yeah. Speaker 3 (10:53) But at the same time, I mean, first of all, this strike on the pipeline from Iraqis. certainly worked in favor of the Houthis. And I would think that Iran has more, I don't know, has more leverage with them since they are, you know, they do benefit. These forces in Iraq do get some support from Iran than the Houthis. I also would say I read today that China has is asking Iran to rein in the Houthis before this gets out of control. I don't know if that's true, but if so, it suggests that China thinks Iran has some leverage. And of course, Iran does have some leverage. Speaker 2 (11:31) They do Speaker 3 (11:31) have Speaker 2 (11:31) leverage. Yeah, I don't discount that relationship entirely. But the Speaker 3 (11:35) larger question is, is there enough coordination between the Houthis and Iran that you can imagine a larger diplomatic game? In other words, as I said, they both actually are rational actors if you look at what they actually do. Iran, you know, does its escalation signaling in a very careful way, if you ask me, much more than Trump. And and so you can imagine a situation where now that they have, you know, they've demonstrated such collective control between the Iraqi militias, you know, the Houthis and Iran. I mean, they have the capacity if they want to go hard enough to really greatly constrict the overall flow of oil out of that region, at