Miranda Fricker on Blame

Philosophy Bites

In this episode of Philosophy Bites, philosopher Miranda Fricker discusses the complex nature of blame and its social functions. She disting

Key takeaways

• Miranda Fricker argues that retributive blame, driven by vengeance, is dysfunctional and unhelpful.
• The concept of 'communicative blame' is proposed as a way to achieve shared moral understanding between parties.

Main topics

• Definitions of Blame
• Retributive vs. Communicative Blame

Notable quotes

I personally think that retributive forms of blaming... don't make any sense.

Conclusion

The episode offers a pragmatic framework for moving away from toxic, v

Transcript preview

Speaker 3 (0:01) This is Speaker 2 (0:02) Philosophy Bites with me, David Edmonds. And me, Speaker 3 (0:05) Nigel Warburton. Philosophy Bites is available at www.philosophybites.com. Speaker 2 (0:10) Should we blame people when they harm us? Many of us do. It's a common reaction to moral failing. But is that response rational and appropriate? Particularly when we recognise that much of what people do is not directly within their control. Miranda Fricker... who delivered the 2026 Oxford Uhiro Lectures, thinks we should blame people less. Miranda Fricker, welcome to Philosophy Bites. Speaker 3 (0:37) Hi, very glad to be back. We're talking today about blame. Philosophers like to define concepts. Is there a neat definition of blame? Speaker 1 (0:46) Well... I tend to suspect that there isn't. I mean, if you look first at the philosophical literature itself, you see a huge array of different views that blame is a hostile emotion, perhaps a reactive attitude. Maybe it's just a judgment. Maybe it's a severing of a relationship after wrongdoing, or maybe it's a protest. And although it's really normal in philosophy that there's lots of different views of one thing, sometimes one starts to suspect there isn't really one thing these are all different views of. And that's my suspicion. Speaker 3 (1:16) So give us an idea of the variety of circumstances in which one might use blame, because one can blame a person, but one can also blame an institution. Speaker 1 (1:25) Yes, I agree. I mean, I think the object of blame can be any kind of agent, and the persons, individuals, or agents, and institutions and collectives, even as big as nations, can be agents. And so they're all proper objects of blame for the things that they do when they're wrong. Does blame have a purpose? Well, I think that the useful way to proceed in all this is first to observe that there's lots of really dysfunctional, not very purposeful, not very morally pleasant forms of blaming. I personally think that retributive forms of blaming that are basically a kind of vengeful payback for a wrong done don't make any sense. And so then it... raises the question, are there other kinds of blaming that we're able to go in for, perhaps that we go in for already, and that we could somehow prioritise as the best kinds? Speaker 3 (2:14) Unpack that a little. What's the retributive idea of blame? Speaker 1 (2:19) Well, basically, it's just the idea that if you wrong me, now I'm at a disadvantage and I'm entitled to get payback from you by causing you a little pain, and to get even is the perfect sort of metaphor for that. So I, you know, without commenting on exactly what one's views might be about criminal punishment, though I'm very tempted to think that retributive ideas there are pretty unpleasant, but certainly in interpersonal morality, I don't believe in its logic and I don't think it's very helpful and I think there are really useful alternatives. Speaker 3 (2:53) So if one's not trying to extract revenge by blaming somebody, what is one trying to communicate? Speaker 1 (3:01) Yes, well, I think the most morally valuable mode of blaming is a mode of blaming that aims to bring the other person to fully appreciate the moral significance of what they've done. So if you blame me for wronging you in some way, maybe I don't fully understand just what the moral significance of my behavior is. It'd be very useful for both you and me that you put it out there in conversation with me. hopefully come to understand what I've done. Or if you've got a bit of a misconception, maybe I push back a little and I say, hey, you know, it wasn't that bad that I told you that lie and so on. And we eventually come to a kind of shared moral understanding of what it is that's gone on between us. Now, that's an ideal, obviously, but it seems to me worth aiming at that ideal. I call it communicative blame. Speaker 3 (3:52) Somebody might come to me and say, why did you do that? And I would say, that's not my fault. Miranda told me to do it. I blame you. I'm not actually communicating with you, I'm communicating with somebody else, but I'm still blaming you. Speaker 1 (4:05) That's absolutely right. And there's lots of modes of blaming which aren't communicative blame or indeed not communicated at all. That's why I think the way to approach blame via communicative blame is to understand we're looking at its moral function or primary good moral function. And that is very different from saying what blame is. I tend to think that if we... come at blame by thinking about the value of communicative blame, so we might then try and stop being retributive, stop just being angry, etc., and focus more on trying to, as it were, achieve a shared moral understanding. That still leaves the question, indeed it actively raises the question, what is it that's communicated in communicative blame? Speaker 3 (4:46) So if I blame you for something, I want you to understand that you're at fault, to acknowledge that, and presumably to articulate it. Speaker 1 (4:56) Yes, if you're going in for communicative blame, that's the purpose, at least of the practice. I'm not saying it has to be exactly your motive, but the style of blaming you go in for should be a practice which is conducive to achieving shared moral understanding. And then this definition of blame that I think is called for once one's done this little bit of functional analysis, in my view, what blame is, is a... judgment of moral fault, because we're talking about moral blame here for the moment, a judgment of moral fault that's in some way activated or animated by some disposition which is appropriate for holding someone responsible. Speaker 3 (5:36) I think you're responsible for a wrong, perhaps a wrong to me, perhaps a wrong to somebody else. What's the role of apology here? Because that seems to be connected to the idea of blame. Speaker 1 (5:47) Yeah, that's a really interesting question. In some ways, I think that community of blame and calling for an apology can merge. So supposing you've... wronged me in some way and I see you