Updating How We Think About Korean Peninsula Security

Global Security Briefing

The episode explores the shifting security paradigm on the Korean Peninsula, moving away from traditional frameworks of unification and denu

Key takeaways

• North Korea has officially abandoned the goal of unification, focusing instead on regime survival and nuclear recognition.
• The relationship between North Korea and Russia has evolved into what both sides call an 'invincible alliance,' involving the exchange of artillery and manpower for missile technology.
• China's role in enabling sanctions evasion and providing dual-use technologies undermines the effectiveness of the UN Security Council.
• South Korea is increasingly acting as a significant arms supplier to European nations undergoing rearmament.
• The potential for a Taiwan contingency poses a strategic risk, as it could create a power vacuum that North Korea might exploit.

Main topics

• North Korean foreign and security policy
• Russia-North Korea military cooperation
• Impact of the Ukraine war on Northeast Asian security

Notable quotes

We must look at North Korea as it is, not as we wish it to be.

Conclusion

The episode highlights the urgent need for a new strategic framework t

Transcript preview

Speaker 1 (0:07) Hello, welcome to RUSI in London. I'm Philip Shetler-Jones and this is Global Security Briefing, the podcast from RUSI's international security team that provides insights on security developments in and between the regions of the world. In this edition of Global Security Briefing, we're putting events in North and South Korea into the right context and looking for answers to the following core questions. Speaker 1 (0:32) What are the priorities for North Korean foreign and security policy? What are the drivers and implications of North Korea's participation as a belligerent in Russia's war against Ukraine? How is South Korea regarding North Korea's more expansive diplomatic and military activity? And what does it mean for security on the peninsula? And then what effects does all this have on the military balance in Northeast Asia, the US alliance system, and our security in Europe? So aiming to address these questions, I'm pleased to welcome two expert guests to GSB. Sang-Gun Seo is a former South Korean diplomat and a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, where his research focuses on nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and East Asian security. His works appeared in publications including our Rusi Journal, also The Diplomat, NBR, with a forthcoming article in the Pacific Review. He's also a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, having done a terrific fellowship with us some time ago. So welcome back, Sangam. Thank you. And our other guest is Edward Howell. Edward is a Lecturer and Research Fellow at the University of Oxford and the Farris Foundation. His expertise is centred on the international relations and security of East Asia, with a particular focus on North and South Korea and DPRK-US relations. DPRK, of course, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the full formal name. North Korea. He's a non-resident fellow of the ASEAN Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul and previously served as a Korean Foundation Fellow at Chatham House. Regular analyst for national and global media, Edward's latest book, A New Axis of Upheaval, North Korea, Russia, China, Iran, will be released in December this year. So welcome to GSB, Edward. Speaker 3 (2:21) Thank you very much, Philip. It's so good to be here. Speaker 1 (2:23) Well, let's set off then. I'll begin with a few framing thoughts. I would say in the past few decades, almost a living memory for my generation, international views on events on the Korean Peninsula were largely framed in terms of two issues, North-South relations and the problem of nuclear proliferation. But developments over the last few years suggest it's probably time to refresh our sense of those priority issues and how they relate to what's happening in the region and beyond. For one thing, North Korea's dropped the goal of unification, and there is currently no diplomatic process between the Koreas on that issue. Polling suggests there's not much support for unification in the South either. We are recording this podcast on the 10th of September, making yesterday the 78th birthday of North Korea. Having been founded in 1948, it has long passed the USSR as the longest existing socialist state in history and shows no sign of stopping. As for nuclear disarmament, the North has made it clear it has no intention to even discuss the issue. And now that China has joined Russia in dropping the topic, the prospects for international action also look bleak. There is speculation that the Trump administration may even be prepared to give some form of recognition to North Korea as a nuclear state, as part of a package of diplomatic agreements. Japan, as well as the US, is seeking a summit with North Korea at the moment. Meanwhile, North and South Korea are both more prominent participants in events further afield, in particular since Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022. North Korea promoted its security relationship with Russia and sends troops to fight against Ukrainian forces. South Korea is an important supplier of weapon systems to European nations embarking on rearmament. Speaker 1 (4:19) So a fresh take on peninsular issues also should take into account a changing context of US-China relations. In the second Trump term, US security policy in East Asia is based on the principles of erecting a strong denial defence on the first island chain and making allies do more for their own defence. The emphasis on the first island chain raises questions about how a potential Sino-US confrontation over Taiwan would affect Korea. President Trump has called South Korea a model ally, yet he's also moved some capabilities out of South Korea and is making concessionary gestures to back his calls to reopen dialogue with the North. So considering all this, if unification and denuclearization are no longer the main framing issues through which to appreciate the importance of Korean Peninsula issues, what should stand in their place? Let's get into the discussion. Edward, if I could turn to you first. Before coming to those issues like the participation in Ukraine, broadly speaking, what would you say are the priorities of North Korea's leadership at the current moment? Speaker 3 (5:29) Thank you very much, Philip. Well, when Kim Jong-un came to power in December 2011, following the death of his father and the second North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, the young Kim at the time, the third North Korean supreme leader, had an ultimate goal, which was for North Korea to be recognized as a de facto nuclear weapons state. And this goal has been pursued with increasing stridency. over the past nearly 15 years and with growing success, which is why it's particularly concerning. I think in addition to recognition as a nuclear weapon state, Kim Jong-un wants sanctions relief. This was a key point of contention when President Donald Trump of the United States and Kim Jong-un met for the second time in Hanoi at a summit that ended inconclusively in February 2019. Just in relation to this recognition as a nuclear weapon state, Kim Jong-un wants not just second strike capability, but a credible second strike capability. He wants to expand the scope and the sophistication of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. And I also think that more than this, that he has a clear goal in mind, which is the removal of the approximately 28,500 US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, stationed in South Korea, and an end to the US-South Korea alliance. And all of this is connected to the nuclear weapons question. If Kim can gain recognition from the US as a nuclear weapons state, he can then call for an end to sanctions, because these sanctions are tied to the nuclear weapons question. he can then call for a withdrawal of the U.S. presence in South Korea. Speaker 1 (7:33) Thank you, Edward. That's a really helpful way of connecting those issues. There's a logic there. Sang-gun, what would be your assessment? Thank you, Philip and Edward, for your Speaker 2 (7:45) thoughts. I would take a very similar view, but let me frame it this way. I do not think North Korea's fundamental priority has really changed. It is still the survival and the stability of the regime and keeping power within the Kim dynasty. So nuclear weapons and cooperation with Russia and the pursuit of international acceptance of its nuclear status are ultimately means to that end. So from that perspective, I agree that nuclear weapon is a really important tool that North Korea has been utilizing to consolidate its power. North Korea knows that It cannot match the combined U.S.-South Korea forces with conventional weapons alone. So nuclear weapons sits at the very center of its military strategy. But they also matter at home because they have become closely associated with military achievement, great power status, and national identity. And that helps reinforce the legitimacy of the regime as well. And the second point regarding the sanctions relief. I would say that maintaining a degree of economic stability is important for Kim Jong-un. And in this aspect, North Korea's economy has grown by roughly 3 % a year since 2023. And cooperation with Russia has also brought in additional substantial resources and foreign currency. So that does not necessarily mean ordinary North Koreans are better off. But if the regime has more resources to work with, and more rents to distribute to key party elites that can still help strengthen its internal stability. So from this perspective, Kim Jong-un's recent record has been a good one, I would say. Speaker 1 (9:35) Interesting. Quite high marks judged in terms of North Korea's own definition of its objectives. Edward, I noticed, speaking of the economy, Russian tourism has become another feature of economic health in the North Korean economy. And that's all connected to the new quality of the relationship with Vladimir Putin's Russia, which seems to me to have taken off around the period right after the beginning of the full-blown invasion in 2022. One of the most interesting developments, I think, in this recent period is what came as a surprise to many of us. the DPRK has become a participant as a belligerent in Russia's war against Ukraine. But why would you say they took that decision to join the war? And what do you find so far the most important consequences of it? Speaker 3 (10:35) The North Korean regime, in all its three dynastic iterations, has always needed money and cash. And the North Korean regime now, as before, will do anything it can to get access to cash. In addition to the pursuit of enhanced nuclear and missile capabilities, when Kim Jong-un decided to... not only send artillery shells, and as of the beginning of this year, 2026, North Korea has sent at least 12 million rounds of artillery to Russia. When Kim Jong-un made that decision to send artillery, then missiles to Russia, then manpower in the form of around about 15,000 North Korean troops to assist Russia's war against Ukraine. Speaker 3 (11:31) This decision was not made on a whim. You know, when Pyongyang got involved in the war, just after the first year, North Korea's economy was on crutches. North Korea's economy was still under lockdown owing to coronavirus. It was in chronic decline. We must remember that when Kim Jong-un decided to lock down the country in January 2020, owing to COVID, it was the best sanction ever enforced on North Korea. And getting involved in Russia's war, therefore, came at a very opportunistic moment for Kim. He knew that this could bring benefits. And the North Korea's regime strategy has always been premised around what I call strategic delinquency, behaving badly in order to reap rewards. So what are the consequences of not just artillery, but missiles and manpower? Well, we've already seen one key consequence, which is that this relationship between Russia and North Korea, in my view, is going to outlive the Ukraine war. It is likely going to change if Putin no longer needs troops, but it's going to stay and get stronger and deepen, but also expand beyond the realm of security. Last year... Russia and North Korea both started to call this relationship an alliance. Pyongyang had called this an alliance ever since the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 2024. Russia was initially a little more reluctant to do so. So now the two countries are in what both sides call an invincible alliance. One of the consequences is the fact that