NCTAUUS

9/11: Two Decades Later

This final episode of '9/11: Two Decades Later' features original audio from the 9-11 Commission's chair and vice-chair as they present thei

Key takeaways

• The U.S. government failed to act on known intelligence about al-Qaeda and potential threats before 9/11 due to fragmented information sharing and institutional inertia.
• Airport security loopholes, such as allowing workers to bypass metal detectors with outdated badges, were identified as critical vulnerabilities that remain unaddressed.

Main topics

• 9/11 Commission findings
• Intelligence failures before 9/11

Notable quotes

"Everyone should go through metal detectors, I believe, without exception." – Vice-Chairman of the 9/11 Commission

"Our government did not watch list future hijackers... Our government did not link the arrest of Zakairis Massawi to heightened indications of attack." – Chairman Thomas Kaine

Conclusion

While significant progress has been made in counterterrorism and national security since

Transcript preview

Speaker 3 (0:07) Soon after the attacks of 9-11, the families of those killed demanded answers. Politicians began pointing fingers, and the American public was wondering if this could ever happen again. Speaker 7 (0:17) Note for the record that 75 % of what we knew about, found out about Osama bin Laden after 9-11, we knew in 1996. 90 % of the facts that we knew about Osama bin Laden, we knew in 1998. But the full story wasn't delivered until after 9-11. It was held in classified, compartmentalized sections. Speaker 3 (0:41) This is 9-11, two decades later. I'm Steve Gregory in Los Angeles. Speaker 3 (0:48) Within a year of the attacks, Congress drafted legislation to create the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly referred to as the 9-11 Commission. On November 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the legislation, which mandated a full and complete accounting of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and recommendations as to how to prevent such attacks in the future. With a budget of $15 million and 80 people on staff, The commission would research, compile, and report on eight points of interest, including al-Qaeda and the organization of the 9-11 attack, intelligence collection, analysis, and management, international counterterrorism policy, including states that harbor or harbored terrorists' terrorist financing. border security and foreign visitors, law enforcement and intelligence collection inside the United States, commercial aviation and transportation security, including the investigation into the four hijackings, and the immediate response to the attacks at the national, state, and local levels, including issues of continuity of government. On July 22, 2004, the 9-11 Commission issued its final report to Congress. The following month, the chair and vice chair of the commission would sit before the Armed Services Committee to discuss the report and take questions. One such exchange happened between Democratic Congresswoman Nita Lowey and Committee Chair Thomas Kaine. Speaker 1 (2:09) In your report, you say, quote, it must take into consideration the full array of possible enemy tactics, such as the use of insiders. Did the commission intend for airport workers, cabin cleaners, maintenance crews, caterers, who are currently permitted to bypass metal detectors, should they be given antiquated badges or should everyone have to go through metal detectors? Speaker 1 (2:40) And I've been repeatedly told by TSA it's too inconvenient and costly to screen all airport workers, despite the fact that 100 % of workers have physically screened at airports like Heathrow, almost 100 % at Charles de Gaulle. This doesn't make sense to me. If you could continue to weigh in on that issue, because I'm sure you agree that everyone should be going through medical detectors, metal detectors. And as a New Yorker, it disturbs me that currently we are so worried about security in the New York area, yet thousands of people are going through every day with antiquated badges. And if we're going to carry out your recommendations, I would like to hear your recommendations as to an adjustment. And since my time is running out, if you can comment on airport security, in particular the fact that thousands of people are currently going through the metal detectors, that thousands of people are not going through the metal detectors with their badges. Thank you very much. Speaker 6 (3:50) Well, everybody should go through metal detectors, I believe, without exception. Do we have Speaker 1 (3:56) to wait for structural change, or do you think we can implement that now? Can it be implemented by executive order? We can't seem to move the FAA or TSA, and business keeps talking about an inconvenience. How can we get that done now? Speaker 6 (4:11) Well, you could probably answer that. probably more about government than I do, but I don't know how you can do these kind of things by executive order or whether you can or whether you have to have something through the United States Congress. I just don't have the expertise to answer that. But it should be done. There's no question about it. I believe that if we're going to create less terrorists, change minds in the Arab world, we've got to change. We can't just be viewed as a military power. We've got to get back to some of the things we used to do in the Cold War to try to win that Cold War and change minds. And that involved not only education expenses, but cultural exchanges, ways in which we're student exchanges, ways in which we allowed these people to get to know us and that we had a better understanding of them. I mean, we've got to get into those what some people call soft areas. We've got to let these people know who we are. And we've got to understand in a much better way who they are. And I'm not talking about the small percentage who want to kill us. I'm talking about the much larger percentage now who don't really like us at all because of what they know of us right now. But if we were able to send a different message, they might like us a bit better. Speaker 3 (5:27) After the release of the report, the 10 commissioners held a press conference. Here's a portion of that conference with opening statements by Chairman Thomas Kaine. Today Speaker 5 (5:35) we present this report and these recommendations. Speaker 5 (5:39) To the President of the United States, to the United States Congress, and the American people, this report represents the unanimous conclusion of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. On September 11, 2001, Speaker 5 (6:01) 19 men armed with knives, box cutters, mace, and pepper spray penetrated the defenses of the most powerful nation in the world. They inflicted unbearable trauma on our people, and at the